Myanmar Inauthentic Behavior Takedown

Some of the domains shared identical content and were associated with just one Google Analytics and/or Google AdSense account, suggesting they were part of networks operated by the same entities. Some of the networks showed some degree of interconnection over time, while others appeared to be distinct.

The assets in the takedown had very high follower numbers. Dozens of the pages had over 1 million followers each, with the largest having over 5 million at the time of the takedown; scores more had followers in the hundreds of thousands. They produced large volumes of content and generated millions of interactions.

The pages appeared to operate for profit. The websites to which they linked often carried ads; some of the Facebook pages carried sponsored posts for commercial products. The majority of the content posted focused on celebrities and gossip; but in the years of their activity the pages also posted a small portion of content dealing with more political subjects or posted about the Myanmar army. A few posts in 2019-20 mentioned the Arakan Army or Rakhine state; a few from 2017 included elements of dangerous speech, notably against Muslims. In an illustration of the porous border between commercial spam and politically-oriented operations, blends of “lifestyle” clickbait with political content have been observed historically both in commercial spam operations, and in influence operations that were attributed to the Myanmar military in 2018 and 2019 (a more recent takedown of Myanmar military assets focused primarily on the Army itself).